ABSTRACT Although software defined network (SDN) has been widely recognized for several years, it still has not addressed security issues regarding permission management on SDN controller, one lack of which is the effective permission allocation of application programming interfaces (APIs) for multitenant requirements. Besides, the tendency of integrating SDN and network function virtualization (NFV) introduces a new problem about permission management on both SDN and NFV APIs. This paper presents a fine-grained permission management for secure sharing of APIs in multi-tenant networks. We propose a permission policy language, which provides three-level permission abstraction to define available APIs for multiple tenants to access both OpenFlow switches and network functions. We introduce a permission management framework to effectively enforce permissions and ensure user isolation. A prototype of the proposed framework is implemented on top of the RYU controller. Extensive experiments show that our system is effective for reducing API abuse and only introduces negligible overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decoupling the control plane and the data forwarding plane, SDN brings new ideas and innovations into the network architecture, and provides stronger programmability and controllability than ever before. In SDN architecture, the logically centralized controller abstracts and manages the underlying infrastructure with southbound API (e.g. OpenFlow protocol) and provides services to upper applications through northbound API [1] . Because of the centralized characteristic and the global network view, the controller is of great significance to the extendibility, automation and programmability of SDN. In recent years, it has been proven that SDN-enabled network is fruitful in numerous scenarios (e.g. Google's B4 network [2] and Microsoft's Ananta in public cloud [3] ).
Despite the proven benefits, the security issues have prevented the adoption of SDN. Therefore, several efforts have been made to analyze and strengthen the security of SDN. As summarized in [4] , there are seven main categories of potential attacks and vulnerabilities that cover all layers of the SDN architecture, ranging from unauthorized access issues to system level security. In particular, due to the centralized control architecture, controller security is especially critical. However, modern mainstream controllers, such as floodlight [5] , RYU [6] , ONOS [7] , have not considered security issues in their framework. While controllers provide network services to applications through northbound APIs, the lack of safeguard procedures may lead to misuse of controller functions. Padekar et al. [8] have discussed several attack cases caused by API abuse. An access control system is needed to protect the controller from northbound API abuse.
Various access control mechanisms have been put forward to secure SDN controller and northbound API. FortNox extends NOX controller with role-based authorization [9] . PermOF identifies the vulnerabilities of exposing the full privilege and proposes a set of permissions enforcement and a customized isolation mechanism [10] . OperationCheckpoint introduces an API-grained permission system that makes sure only API calls from trusted applications will be executed [11] . SDNShield enhances permission system with a two-level permission abstraction named permission token and permission filter for accurate representation of application behavior boundary [12] . All these existing solutions have focused on API permissions or detailed field restriction of API calls content, treating the network infrastructure as a whole. However, usually in a multi-tenant environment, each user has different available network devices and topology views. Thus, divisibility of the network should be also taken into account in a permission system. Besides, all these mechanisms have their own permission abstraction and classification, which is unmodifiable during runtime. Our proposed system enables the administrator to custom permission sets for easy allocation, free classification and dynamical adjustment.
On the other hand, researchers have suggested to integrate SDN and NFV to meet the highly diverse and dynamic network service demands. It is discussed in [13] that how SDN and NFV may benefit from each other. The authors propose a framework named SDNV that combines both SDN and NFV advantages and provides a vision of the integration. Lorenz et al. [14] present an SDN/NFV-enabled architecture to enhance security policy enforcement with the scalability and flexibility of SDN and NFV.
However, current researchers rarely discuss the multitenant scenario. When a complete network is granted to several users, and each user has his own sub-network and different service chains, how can the network administrator manage permissions of both SDN switches and VNFs?
To this end, we propose a fine-grained permission management to protect SDN controller from API misuse as well as considering permission settings in VNF management. A permission abstraction method is proposed to enable the administrator to flexibly configure permissions as expected and dynamically adjust permissions in a parameterized way. In most modern controller frameworks, the controller provides remote services through REST API which gains many benefits (e.g. services for heterogeneous clients and high scalability) but introduces only low overhead [15] . We implement a prototype on RYU controller to enforce permission management for multi-user access by monitoring REST API calls. Furthermore, the permission abstraction method can also be applied to other northbound APIs.
There are two core components in our framework: permission manager and runtime access intermediary. The permission manager abstracts permission as a three-level structure. It also provides a permission policy description language with corresponding interfaces for permission configuration and checks the connectivity of user granted networks. The runtime access intermediary intercepts all REST API calls to ensure the validity and maintains user network topology information. The two components work together to provide a more flexible and comprehensive permission management to secure the SDN controller.
This paper makes the following contributions:
We design a fine-grained permission policy description language that abstracts user permission into three levels, device permission, API permission and field permission. We implement it in JSON format so that user behavior boundary can be restricted in a parameterized and dynamical way.
We design a permission management framework that can easily adapt to SDN/NFV-enabled network. With device as the coarse-grained assignment unit at first, it is possible to configure permissions for different types of network devices.
We propose a network partitioning mechanism which takes network device assignment as the core and is closely relevant to user permission. Therefore, user network topology can be defined with our permission language. User topology will get updated immediately while permission changes.
We introduce a connectivity guarantee module and corresponding algorithm to make sure that user devices are interconnected with each other. With the connectivity of user network guaranteed, related traffic will be handled as expected.
We implement a prototype system of the proposal based on RYU, an open source SDN controller written in Python, and evaluate the effectiveness and performance of the system. The experiment results show that only negligible latency is introduced by permission checking.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the threat model. Section III discusses the related work. In Section IV, we present the system design. Next, we describe the implementation and evaluation of our system in Section V and VI. Discussion is provided in Section VII and Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
The SDN controller provides network services through northbound APIs, which are open interfaces to develop applications. However, not all users are credible. The controller is vulnerable to malicious attackers due to the lack of access control. As discussed in prior researches [8] , [12] , there are a variety of potential attacks against unprotected SDN controllers. Besides, new attacks emerge in SDN and NFV integration network. Among them, we are particularly interested in 4 classes of attacks, which are the motivations of our proposed permission management framework.
1) DATA PLANE INTRUSION
With the ability to notify Packet-In messages and query flow entries, attackers can easily obtain traffic forwarding information. Attackers can also change forwarding behavior or even drop all packets through modifying flow entries. In this way, attackers can easily alter normal network services and carry out attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attack.
2) INFORMATION LEAKAGE
Attackers can get network status information (e.g. network topology, node features, switch statistics and so on) through open APIs. With such information, attackers can further start a Denial of Service (DOS) attack by generating huge number of fake requests.
3) VNFs HIJACK
With the capacity of checking existing rules and setting new rules, attackers can stealthily tamper packets processing logic VOLUME 6, 2018 to hijack the VNFs. Under the control of attackers, VNFs in the network will lose the ability to provide services for valid users.
4) SERVICE CHAINS MANIPULATION
Usually in a SDN-NFV network, SDN is used to guide traffic and VNFs provide security network functions. With control on both OpenFlow switches and VNFs, attackers can optionally modify the order of traffic processing and the behavior of VNFs.
The four classes of attacks discussed above show the vulnerability of an unprotected controller. To address the security issues and reduce the abuse of northbound APIs, we propose a fine-grained permission management framework.
III. RELATED WORK A. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT FOR SDN CONTROLLER
There have been many researches about analyzing vulnerability of SDN network and proposing corresponding defense measures. ROSEMARY [16] emphasizes the destructiveness of malicious applications. It uses sandbox strategy and process containment for isolating apps to protect the control plane from being destabilized by malicious or fault applications. AuthFlow [17] implements its access control through host-level and denies access of unauthorized hosts to solve unauthorized access issues. An authentication and access control mechanism is deployed on top of POX controller, including an authenticator and a RADIUS server. Avantguard [18] extends data plane with connection migration to halt the threats of the control plane saturation attack, which inundates communications between the controller and switches. The proposed approach mediates TCP handshake and only complete handshake will be notified to control plane. Hu et al. [19] combine local rerouting and constrained reverse path forwarding protections to protect control traffic. AEGIS [8] prevents controller APIs from being misused through verifying the usage of API calls in real time by security access rules, which are generated according to relationships between SDN applications and controller critical data.
To further enhance the security of SDN controllers, we propose a general fine-grained SDN permission management framework and a parameterized permission policy description language to protect REST API calls from unrestricted use.
B. PERMISSION POLICY SCHEMES IN SDN
As described in prior work [10] , an access control and permission system will help in protecting controller from misuse of northbound API. SE-Floodlight [20] secures the SDN control layer with an extended security-enforcement kernel(SEK), including an authentication service, role-based authorization, a permission model for mediating configuration change requests and an RCA (Rule-chain Conflict Analysis) algorithm to detect flow rule conflicts. It requires the administrator to pre-assign authorization roles to individual applications. In this way, permissions of one application are related to its role. However, the administrator cannot update permission configuration dynamically and immediately with such design. OperationCheckpoint [11] presents an API-grained permission system to secure the application-control interfaces. The authors define a set of permissions to which the application must subscribe on initialization with the controller. When receiving an operation request associated with one of the permissions, OperationCheckpoint is called to determine whether the related permission has been granted. SDNShield [12] enables fine-grained parameterized permission granting by introducing a two-level permission abstraction named permission token and permission filter. Permission tokens are the coarse-grained application behavior privileges that determine whether an application action is approved or denied. Permission filters are introduced to specify permissions and establish a middle state of permission tokens for more accurate representation of application behavior boundary. All above mentioned approaches regard the network as a whole while protecting the SDN controller from unrestricted access. Different from previous proposals, we consider network resources assignment in conjunction with permission management.
C. SDN-NFV COMBINATION
Many works focus on integrating SDN and NFV. SIMPLE [21] proposes a SDN-based enforcement layer to translate middlebox routing policy into forwarding rules. FlowTags [22] enhances middleboxes with export tags so that the SDN controller can deal with middlebox traffic through new FlowTags APIs. SDNV [13] deploys an architectural framework to fully exploit the advantages of both SDN and NFV, enabling programmable control and rapid innovations in a unified network architecture. A hybrid SDN/NFV approach is presented in [14] to address the scalability issues and management overheads in traditional enterprise networks. SDN and NFV integration network is a hotspot of research in recent years and will play an important role in future network, (e.g. 5G wireless network [23] ). Therefore, we also consider the compatibility of SDN and NFV into our permission design.
D. SDN NETWORK PARTITION
SDN virtualization methods [24] - [26] aim at sharing network infrastructure and defending cross-slice attacks through dividing a SDN network into disjoint parts. These network slicing mechanisms use a hypervisor to assign network for user controllers according to topology information. In contrast, our framework allocates network through permission settings and protects not only disjoint slices of the overall network.
Unlike the previous researches, our study focuses on providing a flexible mechanism to dynamically assign permission and accurately partition the network to meet customized demands and to prevent controller from unlimited API calls at the same time.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN A. OVERVIEW
We propose a general fine-grained permission management framework based on REST API authorization for secure sharing of APIs in multi-tenant networks. The framework works as an extended security system for the network controller, locating between user applications and the controller to prevent user applications from accessing controller and utilizing network resources without any restriction. Figure 1 shows the overview of the proposed framework, which contains two major components, permission manager and runtime access intermediary. Permission manager mainly provides interfaces to pre-configure permissions before application deployment, modify permissions dynamically at runtime, and check for resources availability while user topology changes. Runtime access intermediary aims at securing REST API and network status information during the whole controller lifetime.
The framework works as follow: 1) The administrator defines permission polices to allocate network devices (i.e., switches and network functions) to users and describe the corresponding permissions and behavior boundaries.
2) The administrator also implements specified policies through configuration file or permission set API provided by permission assignment. 3) Once user topology changes caused by permission changes, connectivity guarantee will check the connectivity of allocated devices. If user devices are not interconnected, warning messages will be sent to the administrator. 4) Otherwise, permission manager will generate permissions for user querying and runtime access intermediary checking. 5) Users develop applications according to their available devices and permission descriptions. 6) Runtime access intermediary manages access control during controller lifetime with two submodules. The permission check intercepts all REST API calls to enforce the permissions and record illegal access, while the topology filter maintains user network views according to permission configuration.
We will introduce the two components as well as their modules in details in the following sections.
B. PERMISSION MANAGER
Permission manager works on the controller, providing the administrator with the ability to configure user permissions in a flexible and accurate way. While user topology changes, connectivity of user topology will be checked to make sure all user devices are connected to each other. Permission manager is composed of permission assignment and connectivity guarantee. Permission assignment mainly manages permission policies input. When user topologies change, it also calls connectivity guarantee module for checking connectivity of user network.
1) PERMISSION ASSIGNMENT
Permission assignment provides a permission policy description language and corresponding interfaces to configure permission policy. The administrator is able to manage user permissions through API or configuration file written in permission language, which is described in JSON format. Fine-grained permission management is implemented by abstracting permissions as device permission, API permission and field permission, so that user behavior boundary can be limited at an appropriate granularity. User permission can be described specifically in three levels as follows.
The first level is device permission, which defines accessible network devices. Device ID is assigned to decide whether a user can see a network device (switch or network function) or not. In addition, keyword ''devset'' is provided to customize a device set that describes a series of devices, assigning permissions simultaneously for more than one device. For example, in Figure 2 , a ''devset'' of ''user_devs'' is defined, which includes 5 devices with ID ranging from 2 to 6. The administrator can use the ''user_devs'' to grant permissions for these five devices at once, instead of describing the same permissions one by one for each device.
The second level is API permission. After specifying which network devices the user can use, API permission is used to indicate which kind of API calls will be allowed. Similar to device permission definition, API permission can be specified through certain API name or customized API set defined through keyword ''apiset''. In general, app operations can be divided into three categories: read, notification, and write. Read APIs are used to query network states. Notification APIs help users to subscribe message events and get notified immediately. Write APIs are for updating network states. Besides, our framework provides a reserved keyword ''ALL'' that describes the basic scope of all granted APIs. Final permission is determined by joint efforts of ''ALL'' and the certain API description. As illustrated in Figure 2 , user can access devices in ''user_devs'' via API get_flow_stats and mod_flow_entry. While get_flow_stats calls only need to meet requirements described in ''ALL'', mod_flow_entry calls need to set TCP_DST field as 80 in addition.
The third level is field permission, which restricts user behavior boundaries by defining API work scope. Priority range appoints the maximum and minimum priority that user can set for flow entries in switch or rules in network function. Priority setting is also a simple way to deal with flow rule contradictions. High priority rules will shield low priority rules so that higher priority users' network deployment will be first guaranteed. In this way, fine-grained permission language can assign permissions in a parameterized, flexible, accurate way.
An example of permission configuration is described in Figure 2 , which shows the permission sets of username ''test_user''. As mentioned above, device permission ''user_devs'' means that user ''test_user'' can access to network devices included in set ''user_devs''. For API and field permissions, ''ALL'' requires that IPV4_SRC field in all API call messages should be restricted in the IP address range of 192.168.0.0/24. No extra restriction of get_flow_stats means that messages for getting flow stats only need to meet requirements listed in ''ALL''. Mod_flow_entry indicates that ''test_user'' should set TCP_DST field as 80 in addition when he wants to modify flow entry. Otherwise, his API calls will be denied as exceeding his powers. The second device permission ''8'' allows the user to utilize device 8. ''ALL'' is the same as above. The additional restriction of API mod_rule_entry limits to use device 8 between 8 am and 6 pm on weekdays. The ''test_user'' permission scope is described in Figure 3 . During runtime of user applications, the administrator can update permission configuration dynamically and immediately when users needs change.
Besides, an interface is provided for users to discover the permissions that they have been granted so that application developers will deploy applications under the restriction of their permissions. Once user permissions change, system will also send notification to users to amend the application process.
2) CONNECTIVITY GUARANTEE
If network resources that are granted to a user can not make up a connected network, or the network devices that connect them are not set correctly, traffic between these parts will not be forwarded as expected. For example, Figure 4 (a) shows the whole network topology. Assuming that one user needs switches 2 to 6 and VNF 8. But switch 4 is not granted to him. Dashed part is needed but not assigned, as shown in Figure 4 (b) . In such situation, the user has no permission to access switch 4. When user traffic is not forwarded as expected, user network is not going to work well. So, a mechanism is needed to help guaranteeing the availability of user network resources. When the administrator modifies user device permissions, adding or deleting device that users can access, connectivity guarantee will check connectivity of granted network resources according to user network topology. Once the administrator's operation makes some parts of the user's resources unreachable, warning message will be fed back for informing the administrator to adjust permission configuration.
Warshall algorithm [28] , [29] is used to check connectivity of user network resources. The whole process flow is described in Algorithm 1. T is two-dimensional matrix that stores user topology information. The value of matrix elements represents the connection status of two device nodes. 1 means connected and 0 means disconnected. N represents the device node.
Warshall algorithm was proposed to calculate transitive closure of relation matrices. Network topology in essence is an undirected graph, So the issue is transformed into the connectivity of undirected graphs. If node i, j and node k, i are both connected, then node k, j are also connected. Topology is connected if all elements in the topology matrix are set to 1 after the process described in Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1 The Process Flow of Connectivity Guarantee Algorithm
Input: user topology two-dimensional matrix T Output: the true or false result of user topology connectivity 1: for all N i ∈ user_devs do 2: for all N j ∈ user_devs do 3: if T (N i , N j ) == 1 then 4: for all N k ∈ user_devs do 5: if T (N k , N i ) == 1 then 6: 
end if 8: end for 9: end if 10: end for 11: end for 12: 13: for all N i ∈ user_devs do 14: for all N j ∈ user_devs do 15: if T (N i , N j ) == 0 then 16: return false 17: end if 18: end for 19 : end for 20: 21: return true
C. RUNTIME ACCESS INTERMEDIARY
Runtime access intermediary is located between the controller and user applications, making sure REST API calls are authorized according to permission configuration from permission manager. With runtime access intermediary, all API calls should meet permission requirements, ensuring the security of REST API. Runtime access intermediary contains permission check and topology filter. Permission check detects all API calls to enforce permissions while topology filter maintains user topology information.
1) PERMISSION CHECK
Due to the lack of access control, a malicious application can cause the controller program to crash, by consuming a large amount of system resources such as CPU and memory, or by modifying important internal data (e.g. network topology information) [16] , [18] .
Permission check works as a runtime orchestration to execute the fine-grained permission checking method and check the legitimacy of API calls. When receiving a REST API request, permission check first parses the content of the API call, such as username, targeted device ID, API name and specific fields. Then, it queries permission settings of corresponding user and checks whether the permissions needed have been granted. If the API call is authenticated, user request will be executed and execution result will be returned. Otherwise, the module will return message reporting unauthorized access to tell user that the API call is beyond his authority. During the whole runtime, permission check will log the API calls. In addition, while user application inserts flow entries into switches and rules into network functions to control the network, user information will be added to prevent user flow entries and rules from being modified maliciously VOLUME 6, 2018 by other users. To this end, we add a user_id field into the flow entry. Each user is assigned a unique ID. When users push flows, their IDs will be recorded, too.
2) TOPOLOGY FILTER
In a multi-user environment, each user is usually assigned only part of the network. As discussed in section IV-B2, when devices 2 to 6 and 8 are granted to the user, the network topology is shown in Figure 4 (c) , which is a subnet of the whole network. In order to protect the network infrastructure, which devices a user can see should be limited. Topology filter aims at managing user topology view according to permission configuration.
In SDN virtualization methods [24] - [26] , the network partition is based on topology. The hypervisor assigns switches, links and ports for user virtual SDN. In our framework, user topology view is decided by the device permissions granted to him. Once the user has the permission to access two directlyadjacent devices, the link connecting them and the corresponding ports are also added to his topology. For example, in Figure 4 (b), the four dashed links and relevant ports will not appear in user topology because one endpoint of these links (i.e. device 4) is not granted to the user. User topology will change to Figure 4 (c) after device 4 is allocated to him. Topology filter maintains user topology described by permission configuration and updates user topology immediately when device permissions change.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement our prototype system using RYU controller, a component-based SDN controller fully written in Python. As mentioned above, our system mainly aims at preventing REST API from unlimited access. Therefore, most of our codes are added to extend the REST API component which is named ofctl_rest. Due to language features of Python, we have not altered RYU original code. Our system implementation consists of two major components: 1) permission manager that parses security policies and generates permissions. 2) runtime access intermediary that enforces permissions and maintains user topology view. In addition, we add a simple interface to configure rules for VNFs (firewall Iptables and catching proxy Squid in our experiment), and extend parts of existing APIs to get information about VNFs.
A. PERMISSION MANAGER 1) PERMISSION ASSIGNMENT
The major function of permission assignment is to generate permissions. For this purpose, we provide two methods for the administrator to deploy permission policies. A configuration file for initial permissions during the loading of REST API module, and a permission_set API for updating permission at runtime. Besides, a permission_get API is also provided for users to query granted permissions, so that their applications will not operate beyond limits.
2) CONNECTIVITY GUARANTEE
As described in section IV-B2, the basic data of connectivity guarantee is the two-dimensional matrix that records user topology information. Hence, we generate an exclusive topology matrix according to permission configuration when a user is added into the permission system for the first time. The matrix will also get updated when permissions change. When user topology matrix is generated or updated, the module will execute the connectivity guarantee algorithm and report the connectivity result to the administrator.
B. RUNTIME ACCESS INTERMEDIARY 1) PERMISSION CHECK
The permission check intercepts REST API calls and checks for validity to secure the controller. In RYU REST API framework, a WSGIApplication class is used to provide URI services and retrieve HTTP requests. Then, a StatsController class is defined for request handling. Each URI has a corresponding handler function in this class. We use a permission_check decorator to enforce permissions. Upon receiving a request, the check function parses the request content to check if permission has been assigned and verify the validity of parameters. Only valid request can execute the objective function to gain information about the network or to insert rules into network devices. In this way, we implement the function of permission check without changing the original request handler function codes. In addition, all REST API calls will be logged, whether executed or denied.
2) TOPOLOGY FILTER
The topology filter is designed to manage user network view. There are two ways for user to gain topology information through RYU REST API: an extended URI interface to query granted switches and VNFs, and a web topology GUI to visually show the network topology information (including devices, links and ports). When a user calls these two interfaces, topology filter will filter return message on the basis of user permission, making sure that he can only see the devices that are granted.
C. COMPATIBLE WITH NFV
In order to expound our permission abstractions more clearly, we implement a simple combination mechanism for SDN and NFV. Messages will be send to the controller during the VNF program initialization phase, thus, to establish the connection to the device and record its type. Then, the controller will allocate a device ID for this VNF. Interfaces are also added in VNFs to receive rule change messages from the controller and to send status information to the controller for comprehensive view of the network. Our prototype experiments have used extended catching proxy Squid and firewall Iptables to demonstrate our enhanced permission abstraction.
VI. EVALUATION A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
Our experiments use one server, which is equipped with a Quad-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1220 v3 @ 3.10GHz processor and 8 GB of RAM. We establish a virtual machine that is configured with 2 cores of the processor, 2 GB of RAM, and Ubuntu 14.04.1 system. The virtual machine runs the extended RYU controller 3.29. The OpenFlow network is realized by Mininet 2.3.0d1 [30] and Open vSwitch 2.5.0 [31] . The two kind of VNFs used in our experiment are: caching proxy Squid-2.7.STABLE9 [27] and firewall Iptables v1.4.20 [32] .
B. PERFORMANCE 1) STARTUP TIME During controller startup phase, time overhead is introduced due to loading and parsing permission policies. In this experiment, we kill irrelevant programs before test to ensure stability of experiment results. The timer starts at the beginning of the main() function and ends after all components loaded, which are ofctl_rest, simple_switch_13 and topology viewer in this test. We measure the boot up time with increasing user numbers in initial permission policy. Permissions of each user have 3-5 device IDs or devsets as device permissions. Each device permission consists of 3-5 API permissions. Each API permission includes 5 field permissions. We run each test for 10 times and present the average result. As shown in Figure 5 , the startup time increases with the number of user permission entries. The overhead of loading permissions comes to 10% when there are 20 user permission entries. However, the original controller without permission system takes about 30ms to boot up, which is a short amount of time. The extra latency for permission loading phase is 3ms at most in our experiments. Therefore, the performance overhead of the initialization phase is slight and approximately linear to the number of permission policies.
2) CONNECTIVITY GUARANTEE CONSUMPTION
The overhead introduced by connectivity guarantee is obviously related to the number of device nodes in the network. We evaluate the execution time of connectivity guarantee process, including two main phases: update user topology matrix and execute the connectivity check algorithm. We vary the device number from 10 to 100 to measure the execution time. For each case, we create a random network with Mininet and allocate device permissions that contain about half of all the devices to user for 10 times. The timer starts at the beginning of the process and ends when a true of false result is returned. The results, shown in Figure 6 , indicate that the execution time rapidly grows with the increasing number of nodes in the network. The connectivity guarantee spends 0.16ms to check user network connectivity while there are 10 nodes. This time becomes about 11ms when the node number increases to 100. However, it is still a relatively short time. The overhead of connectivity guarantee is acceptable in general because it takes only milliseconds. That is, during the controller runtime, updated permissions will take effect within milliseconds.
3) PERMISSION CHECK LATENCY
Our system checks permission for every REST API call to ensure validity, which certainly introduces latency in API calls. Figure 7 compares the execution times of several common API handle functions with and without permission control. Note that the three APIs of get_flow_stats, get_rule_entry and get_port_desc (in the right of the figure) need to wait for devices' responses. The network transmission time between controller and devices is much longer than the execution time of API handle function itself. So, their execu- tion times are much longer. Due to the randomness of network transmission time, the execution time of API get_flow_stats without permission control is even longer in our experiments. As shown in the left part of the figure, the most important APIs for user to control the network (e.g. mod_flow_entry for OpenFlow switches and mod_rule_entry for network functions) only need less than 1ms. The latency introduced by permission checking is less than 0.1ms. Get_permission and set_permission are two APIs we add to the permission system. Their execution times are less than 0.2ms, which are also very short. Generally speaking, the overhead of permission checking is negligible.
C. EFFECTIVENESS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our permission system, we simulate two use cases.
1) SDN-ONLY SCENARIO
We create a Mininet emulated network consisting of two hosts (h1 and h2). The two hosts are connected with an Open vSwitch. The switch is controlled by a remote extended RYU controller. There is a server program on h2. A client that connects to the server through TCP protocol runs on h1. The controller initializes with a ofctl_rest component that provides REST API services and a simple_switch_13 component that implements L2 learning switch, without any permission configuration. A REST API based user application is prepared for a remote user to view the network topology, get device information (e.g. device id, features, flow entries), and insert rules to change traffic between the two hosts.
At first, the two hosts communicate well. The user application can do nothing because there is no permission assigned. Then we assign permissions for the user to call mod_flow_entry API with actions restricted as DROP. After permissions granted, the application successfully calls APIs to insert flow entries into the switch. With flow entries inserted, the traffic between two hosts is blocked. Besides, the traffic return to normal again when we revoke user permissions. During the whole time, all API calls are successfully handled according to the permission requirements.
2) SDN AND NFV COMBINATION
We emulate a network that integrates SDN and NFV, as described in Figure 4 (a). The controller initializes with a configuration file as described in Figure 2 . But, we first set the devset user_devs as [2, 3, 5, 6] . The complete network in administrator view is shown in Figure 8 (a) . The user topology view is filtered as shown in Figure 8 (b) , as expected. However, network devices in user network are not connected to each other for now. Thus connectivity guarantee notifies the administrator. After we add device 4 into the devset user_devs, user network topology gets updated as shown in Figure 8 (c). With permissions granted, the user is able to insert flow entries into switches to control traffic in the assigned network and configure rules into VNFs to implement specific network functions. All API calls are checked to meet the permission restriction.
The results show that the permission system is able to prevent over-privileged issues with appropriate permission policies.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
We propose a flexible and accurate fine-grained permission management framework and implement a prototype system for SDN/NFV-enabled network to share and prevent abuses of APIs. However, there are some limitations in current design.
First, when considering the remote access modes in multiuser environment, we implement our permission system based on REST API of RYU controller. However, we believe that our permission design method applies equally to all kind of northbound APIs and other controllers. Since all operations that are related to underlying infrastructure will be translated to OpenFlow messages. Therefore, extending our system to protect all kinds of northbound APIs should be quite easy. We expect to do this in the near future.
Second, our permission management framework primarily focuses on permission abstraction in a multi-user SDN-NFV network. Current design of the proposed framework requires the network administrator to allocate permissions at first. Users can only query permission sets and call APIs in restriction. Our current framework does not support users to express their permission needs. Permission request interfaces and a permission reconciliation module will be added to support that in our future work.
Third, in our current system, we only consider the VNFs of firewall Iptables and caching proxy Squid. However, there are many kinds of VNFs, each with different rule patterns and properties. Therefore, a way to standardize different VNFs and combine with SDN network is needed. We expect to address this problem in the near future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With open APIs for programmable services, SDN controllers are vulnerable to API abuse, which incurs a series of attacks to the control-plane. Moreover, SDN and NFV are integrated more and more often. Therefore, we propose a finegrained permission management framework to secure the controller in the SDN-NFV enabled network. The framework consists of permission manager for permission assignment and update and runtime access intermediary for runtime permission check and user topology information maintenance. To allocate permissions flexibly and precisely in a parameterized way, we also propose a permission policy language to abstract permissions into three levels. We have implemented the proposed framework based on the extend RYU controller. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness on successfully restricting user behavior in specific scope with only trivial overheads. 
